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Global Intelligence Update. Red Alert June 8, 1998 http://www.stratfor.com

Whatever happens to oil prices, however, something extraordinary has happened in the oil equation. For the second time this year, crucial decisions on oil production policy have been taken by three nations meeting privately. Only one of these nations is from the Persian Gulf, which is conventionally regarded as the center of gravity of oil production. No one was present from Central Asia, regarded as the emerging center of gravity. Two of the nations present were from Latin America. This is of tremendous long term significance for the international system. Saudi Arabia, the acknowledged power of petroleum exporters, was forced to turn to Venezuela and Mexico to have any hope of raising oil prices.

There is something odd in this. Venezuela exports a little over 5 percent of the world's oil, while Mexico exports less than 4 percent. Saudi Arabia exports 20 percent, while the Persian Gulf taken together controls over one-third of the world export markets. Other non-OPEC countries, like Norway and Russia, each export more than 7 percent of the world's  petroleum. Thus, the numbers alone don't explain why Saudi Arabia has become so dependent on Latin American producers for market control.

There are several reasons for the Saudis' reliance on Latin America. First, the Persian Gulf states are a fractious lot under the best of circumstances. Following this week's cuts, Kuwait and Iran both made it clear that they would wait before agreeing to cut their own production, even though both had previously called for additional cuts. Morever, even if all the Persian Gulf producers could be lined up on one side of the issue, their market share would not be enough to control world markets without outside support. Thus, the Saudis realize that their ability to deliver the Persian Gulf producers would depend on their ability to generate outside support. Lining up non-Persian Gulf support became critical for holding the Persian Gulf producers together. In the end, the fact was that even with Saudi Arabia speaking for all of them, including Iran, the Persian Gulf states simply don't have the economic power to impose their will any longer.

Russia and Norway are the largest non-Arab, non-OPEC exporters. But Russia is not in a position to cut production. Indeed, if the last few weeks are any indication, the Saudis will be lucky if the Russians don't want to increase production. Norway, on the other hand, is an industrialized nation and an integral part of Europe, at least unofficially. As much as Norway benefits from higher oil prices, its industrial sector, and those of its European trading partners, is hurt by them. Norway is hardly going to lead the pack in raising prices.

This is the core problem. Oil producers are falling into two groups. Some, like Russia and Indonesia, could not possibly afford to cut production, regardless of the long-term benefits. Others, like Norway and Canada, are on the whole beneficiaries of low oil prices in spite of the fact that they are also exporting oil. The number of nations that have an interest in higher oil prices and can afford to cut production is rather limited. They do not include traditional powers, such as Kuwait, or industrial producers like Norway.

They do include Venezuela and Mexico. Venezuela is particularly important because it exports almost all of its production. Thus, production cuts in Venezuela have disproportionate effects on export availability. More important, Venezuela has vast reserves and is therefore critically important to the long term stability of the market. Both Mexico and Venezuela are interested in higher prices and are in positions to curtail production in order to achieve those prices. This has created a dramatically new constellation of oil powers, defined less by their production and export rankings than by their relative freedom to maneuver.

As much as both Mexico and Venezuela have been hurt by lower energy prices, they are in substantially better condition than other oil exporters. This is in part the result of the fact that countries like Kuwait and Indonesia have dramatically overreached themselves in their development plans, which has left them incapable of cutting back on consumption without seriously damaging their economies. Mexico and Venezuela have combined solid growth in recent years with much more modest development policies, leaving them with room to maneuver. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, more financially exposed than Mexico or Venezuela, finds itself dependent on their willingness to cooperate in controlling production.

We are not persuaded that this consortium will be able to lead the oil producing world back to $20 a barrel oil. But that is not the important point. The increased power of the Latin American producers is part of the general process that has led us to regard Latin America as the growth leader of the next generation. But the increased power of the Latin American producers also points to the decreased power of the Persian Gulf producers. Not only has their economic position deteriorated internally, but their external dependence has shifted as well. The Saudis cannot any longer speak to the Iranians or the Omanis to determine the course of the oil market. They now must speak to the Venezuelans and Mexicans, who may or may not accommodate them.

The shift in the center of gravity of energy decision making to the Western Hemisphere obviously shifts the political landscape as well. Mexico and Venezuela are both well in the American sphere of influence. As good as that is for the United States, it means that a new set of issues are emerging for the U.S.. The stability of both Venezuela and Mexico are of critical importance to the United States, not only because they are nearby, but also because they have become central pieces in the global energy equation. This increases the importance of maintaining stability in both countries.

Thus, the Colombian mess, always a regional issue, becomes crucial for the United States because of the proximity of Venezuela. If the Persian Gulf is important because its ability to affect the availability and price of oil, then with Mexico and Venezuela in similar key positions, containing the Colombian chaos becomes an issue on the order of the Persian Gulf. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States is increasing the tempo of its involvement in Colombia at this time. Similarly, instability in Mexico is more than a border issue for the United States. Suddenly, two of the world's largest commodity markets, oil and drugs, are coming together into a single policy dilemma for the United States. With two out of the three major decision makers in the oil field now speaking Spanish, we have entered a new epoch in energy policy. The implications are enormous and, as yet, poorly thought out.

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Russia enters the oil market with clear aspirations to be the controlling player

  • Arab oil embargo will benefit especially Russia. June 19, 2002

ABU DHABI [MENL] -- Arab oil experts are arguing that an embargo will no longer be effective.

The experts, attending an energy conference in Abu Dhabi, said Arab League members could no longer be counted on to enforce such an embargo of Israel and the West. They said the Arabs are threatened by emerging oil competitors, particularly Russia, that would make up for the shortfall.

Over the last few months, Iran and Iraq have pressed for an oil embargo of Israel and the United States. Iraq ended oil exports under United Nations supervision for one month in a demonstration of solidarity with the Palestinians.

But the experts said Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have no plans to follow Iraq's example. They said a Gulf Arab oil embargo would severely weaken those two countries at the time when their dependence on the West is greater than ever. Middle East Newsline editor@menewsline.com

  • Russian Oil To Flood Markets, Sabotage OPEC Production Cuts. Jan. 2002

Russia is ratcheting up total oil output faster than any other major oil producer. In doing so, it might breach relations with OPEC beyond repair, leading to years of depressed prices. Click below to read the STRATFOR analysis:
http://www.stratfor.com/fib/fib_view.php?ID=202948

Russia Seeking Oil Dominance: In order to regain its share of the energy resources market, Russia is seeking to surpass Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer. Much to OPEC's chagrin, Moscow is reaching the point where such a goal is well within its reach.
http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=203270

  • Moscow's Oil Export "Promise" Opens Policy Doors" March 27, 2002

Russia is playing both sides of the oil game - reducing exports in name but not in actual barrels - giving it a fresh set of policy options. Should the need arise, Moscow can either cater to or strike against OPEC or the West, all the while keeping its own economic house in order.
http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=203587

  • New Political Dialogue Will Aid Russian Oil Exports  May 30, 2002

The formalization of warmer relations between Russia and the West this week is unlikely to produce any substantive changes in the short term. In fact, the most significant development was a seemingly inconsequential energy dialogue opened with the United States that could eventually put Russia ahead of Saudi Arabia in oil production and exports.
http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=204620

  • Stratfor: Russia-Israeli Oil Deal Could Weaken Saudi Position
    Gamla: News And Views From Israel Volume 3 Issue 55 Jerusalem, Israel 03 Nov.'02

The historical animosity between Israel and Russia softened after the Cold War, due in part to Russian immigration to Israel and Moscow's growing problems with Muslims. Since Sept. 11, that détente has transformed further into a tacit alliance. A new oil-transfer agreement now will empower the former adversaries to jointly undermine a common foe: Saudi Arabia.

Analysis
During the Cold War, Moscow and Israel found themselves frequently at odds. Israel not only disliked the Soviet Union's penchant for supporting the Arab world but deplored Moscow's treatment of its Jewish population. For its part, Moscow was infuriated by the U.S. proxy's ability to suppress Soviet-equipped Arab states, and viewed the Israeli nuclear arsenal with a wary eye.

However, following the end of the Cold War, this animosity softened. Approximately 1 million Russian Jews have immigrated to Israel since 1992; they now comprise 15 percent of the total population. That population shift has not only altered Israel's internal political dynamic but also has given the two states a role in each other's cultures and economies.

There are now a multitude of regular, direct flights between Israel and Russia. As Russia shed its Communist/Stalinist ideologies, Orthodox Christianity also reasserted itself in the country fits and starts. This, combined with the war in Chechnya and the humiliating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, has helped to foster a view of Muslims among Russian policymakers similar to that held by Israeli leaders.

After Sept. 11, the détente between the two countries evolved even further into a tacit alliance. Both are concerned about their internal security, particularly as it intersects with internal -- and external -- Muslim populations. They have reasons to seek U.S. friendship and support, but resist becoming American stooges.

They also see Saudi Arabia as a key adversary and competitor for U.S. patronage. This is true for Israel because Riyadh is a rising Arab military power with financial links throughout the Arab world, and for Russia because Saudi Arabia's oil policies helped dethrone Soviet power. Both states detest the proclivities of influential Saudis to spread the Wahhabi form of Islam and to support organizations like al Qaeda.

The Deal
Now a new deal between the Russian and Israeli governments is likely to inject a combination of economics and security into their growing relationship. The proposed plan focuses on an Israeli oil-transit pipeline known as Tipline. Built in 1968, Tipline was part of an Iranian-Israeli effort to bypass the Suez Canal, but with the Shah's overthrow in 1979, it fell into relative disuse -- rarely pumping more than a fraction of its 900,000 barrel-per-day design capacity.

If the developing Israeli-Russian deal is finalized, the northward-flowing Tipline will be reversed. Tankers bearing Russian crude from the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk would unload at Israel's Mediterranean port of Ashkelon. After that, the oil would traverse the Tipline to Israel's Red Sea port of Eilat, where it would be reloaded onto tankers for shipment to Asia. The Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Co. estimates the pipeline will be ready for Russian crude in mid-2003.

The deal offers financial benefits to both players. Israel already imports more than 99 percent of its 278,000 barrels of daily consumption. Since nearly all of Russia's waterborne exports travel through the Mediterranean, supplying a portion of the Israeli market is a relatively simple matter for Moscow.

For Israel, cultivating a non-Arab oil source is always important. Furthermore, with the Israeli budget in chronic deficit, the transit income is a welcome injection of cash into both the economy and state budget.

The Real Reasons
But in the case of Russia and Israel, the logic of the plan goes beyond a simple pipeline deal. Moscow's real interest is what lies on the other side of Israel: Asia.

The existing trans-Sinai transit pipelines, particularly Egypt's Sumed line, flow from the south to the north, sending Middle Eastern oil to the Mediterranean. Egypt also restricts oil tankers' ability to traverse the Suez Canal for safety and environmental reasons. Reversing the Tipline will allow up to 1 million barrels of Russian and Central Asian crude a day to slip into Asia.

This is no small feat for Moscow. Russia lacks any meaningful Asian export route, despite its long Pacific coastline. Currently, its only Asian-oriented petroleum exports include seasonal production at Sakhalin Island and the even smaller amounts that trickle out via Vladivostok and Nakhodka. Combined, they total less than 100,000 barrels per day on average. Through pipelines and Sakhalin Island, Moscow ultimately hopes to supply as much as 2 million bpd via its Far Eastern territories, but that is several years off at best, since a route for any Pacific pipeline has yet to be decided.

The use of Tipline will allow Russia to ship oil reliably to Asia, a market on which Saudi Arabia and the states of the Persian Gulf have long held a monopoly. Saudi control of this market is so sure that Asian consumers have been forced to pay an "Asian premium" that often tops $3 a barrel. The emergence of Russian oil in Asia is sure to both soften the surcharge and weaken the Saudi grip on the market.

Israel's interest in the deal is similarly complex. Once Russian crude begins transiting Tipline, Israel will become responsible for the security of Russian oil on its territory. Since Arab shippers as a general rule tend to boycott Israeli ports, it is almost certain that the Jewish state will become involved in the shipping of Russian crude through the Red Sea. That would add economic rationale to Israel's already growing naval presence and justify the Israel Defense Force's power-projection capability throughout the Red Sea, the Bab el Mandab and into the Arabian Sea.

The Saudi Connection
While the deal makes sense for both parties on its own merits, it likely has escaped neither side that they are neatly flanking Saudi Arabia in both military and economic terms. Both view the kingdom as a long-term strategic threat, and both have an interest in weakening the U.S.-Saudi connection.

Tipline is a convenient tool to that end. Anything that increases Russia's overall presence on the oil markets, by definition, reduces global dependence upon Saudi oil, which is a goal of the Bush administration. Expanded Israeli power projection in Saudi Arabia's most densely populated region is a boon to U.S. efforts both to protect shipping and to minimize terrorism threats.

It is unclear what Saudi Arabia can do to counter this dual threat. The deal is largely a commercial venture, which limits Riyadh's options. Saudi oil certainly can out-compete Russian oil in Asia, but only with a reduction in the premium, which would be a tacit loss.

Wealthy Saudis could increase their support for Muslim militants, such as Hamas or the Chechens. But while this would raise the stress level in the Israeli and Russian capitals, aside from the odd attack on Tipline itself, such support would have little effect on commercial operations. Thus, any Saudi response is confined largely to matters of degree or issues of linkage; there is little in the Israeli-Russian deal that Riyadh can directly affect.

AFRICA

  • Trade With West Boosts African Infrastructure (May 2002)

As the United States and Europe eagerly eye the oil boom in Africa, the tempo of trade is picking up. Investors will soon pave the way for expanding economic ties through development of badly needed transportation infrastructure.
http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=204597

  • Nigerian Natural Gas Push Aimed at U.S. Market (May 2002)

Nigeria is eager to capitalize on its considerable natural gas reserves and is pushing for a deal to supply not only Europe but also the United States.

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